Chinese hacker used ARTEX AI suite and Claude agents to attack South

🚨 ACTIVE EXPLOITATION

• Chinese hacker used ARTEX AI suite and Claude agents to attack South Korean banks
  CrowdStrike found a China-based hacker used the ARTEX AI pentesting suite and Claude Code to attack South Korean banks, exposing customer data.
  • Targets included Shinhan Bank, KB Kookmin Bank, and Hana Bank; at least nine banks hit since late September, with Shinhan reporting ~25,000 customers' personal data exposed and KB Kookmin 119
  • CrowdStrike found open directories with Claude Code session histories, ARTEX configs, and memory files confirming the tooling
  • ARTEX used DeepSeek v4.1-flash as primary LLM backend, supplemented with GLM-5.3 (Zhipu AI) and Grok 4.6, likely accessed via LLM proxy xcai[.]pro
  • The attacker exposed personal details by using the same AI tools to write a résumé; likely a 26-year-old in Guangdong, China
  • ARTEX's developer made the project closed-source after confirming real-world use, but English and Korean derivatives already exist
  Sources 📄 Source: live.euronext.com · 📎 Coverage: bleepingcomputer.com · 👁 via BleepingComputer

🕵️ RESEARCH & DEEP DIVES

• Report: ~1,000 of 1,280 AI-embedded third-party products operate outside SSO, invisible to identity controls
  The 2026 State of Agent Security Report finds most third-party AI agents in enterprise environments are invisible to identity infrastructure because they never authenticate through SSO.

  • Applies to enterprises adopting third-party software with embedded AI agents; ~1,280 such products found in studied environments, only ~282 behind SSO.
  • Agents arrive 'inherited' inside platform updates (e.g. Salesforce's Slack Code coding agent) or as configured agents on vendor runtimes, bypassing procurement and security review.
  • Risk stems mainly from agent scaffolding, inherited OAuth scopes and permissions, and transitive connectivity to systems like Salesforce, Slack, GitHub, and data warehouses — not the models themselves.
  • JPMorgan Chase CISO Patrick Opet has flagged agents as a third-party supply-chain risk, and EU AI Act obligations phasing in through 2026 presume enterprises can inventory their AI systems and owners.
  • The analysis, contributed by agent security vendor Reco, proposes governing agents via identity, permissions, connectivity, and activity questions with continuous live visibility.
  Sources 📎 Coverage: thehackernews.com · 👁 via The Hacker News

• Miri stored all environment variables in target/, leaking CI secrets via GitHub Actions caches
  Miri persisted all environment variables into target/, leaking CI secrets to pull request runs when the directory was cached in GitHub Actions.

  • Affects Rust projects running cargo miri in GitHub Actions where secrets are passed as environment variables to the Miri step
  • Miri stored all environment variables into target/ to retain build-relevant settings between runs
  • Workflows caching target/ via actions/cache or swatinem/rust-cache exposed those secrets to pull request runs that can restore the cache
  • Attackers who previously landed a change could extract secrets from the cache and cover tracks by pushing an overwritten commit, which GitHub may hide in its UI
  • Fixed in the 2026-09-22 nightly: Miri now preserves only CARGO_** variables (except CARGO_**_TOKEN) and OUT_DIR; an ecosystem scan found 1 affected repository
  Sources 📎 Coverage: reddit.com · 👁 via r/netsec

• PortSwigger: overlapping CSS fragments exfiltrate tokens hundreds of characters long
  PortSwigger researcher Alex Craig demonstrated a new CSS injection technique that exfiltrates tokens hundreds of characters long by stitching overlapping fragments.

  • Applies to web apps that allow CSS injection or unsafe inline styles where secrets like login tokens appear in the DOM.
  • CSS attribute selectors (value^=, value$=) reveal which short chunks appear in a token without revealing position.
  • Overlapping 3-4 character chunks are modeled as a graph and stitched into a route to reconstruct the full token.
  • A 223 KB stylesheet recovered 640-character tokens with up to five candidates; 1.33 MB recovered 210 characters with a single guess.
  • Prior technique required ~250 MB of CSS to recover a 12-character token.
  Sources 📎 Coverage: portswigger.net · 👁 via r/netsec

🔓 CVEs & KEV

• CVE-2026-56857 — Go standard library os — CVSS 9.8 — Root.Mkdir(All) can follow junctions out of the root on Windows in osOn Windo...

• CVE-2026-78663 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 9.1 — Double flow control refund on HTTP/2 server streams in net/httpThe HTTP/2 ser...

• CVE-2026-94439 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 7.5 — HTTP/1 server connection desynchronization after 2xx CONNECT response in net/...

• CVE-2026-78669 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 7.5 — Excessive CPU consumption from repeated initial window changes in net/httpA m...

• CVE-2026-78660 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 7.5 — HTTP/2 transport accepts malformed framing-related headers in net/httpHistori...

• CVE-2026-78667 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 7.5 — Lack of limit on size of parsed Range headers in net/httpWhen parsing a Range...

• CVE-2026-94440 — Go standard library net/textproto — CVSS 7.5 — Memory limit bypass when parsing MIME headers in net/textproto, mime/multipar...

• CVE-2026-97031 — Go standard library crypto/tls — CVSS 7.5 — Reject malformed ECH outer extension references in crypto/tlsMultiple ECH out...

• CVE-2026-56866 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 7.5 — HTTP/1 client connection desynchronization after CONNECT rejection in net/htt...

• CVE-2026-78659 — Go standard library net/http — CVSS 7.5 — HTTP/2 server memory exhaustion due to Trailer headers in net/httpWhen "Trail...

📋 ADVISORIES

• 📄 Source for NCSC CTO weekly summary highlights China-linked Integrity Technology Group exposure and UK cyber policy moves — ncsc.gov.uk